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consider the effects a change in the minimum wage has on the employment of 
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1. Introduction 
Illegal immigration is a very hot social and economic issue facing many technologically 
advanced countries. Despite efforts to limit the number of immigrants allowed into 
these countries, the illegal immigrant stock is rising. It is difficult to accurately estimate 
the number of illegal immigrants. At the beginning of 2000, some OECD countries 
published official figures of unauthorized immigrants.
2 In the USA, estimates were 
between 4 to 7 million,
3 which is about 1.5% of the population. In Greece it was about 
3% and in Italy about 0.5%. The increasing stock of illegal immigrants has turned it into 
a central issue in numerous elections throughout the Western Hemisphere. 
  The effect of legal immigration on the host country’s welfare is controversial. 
Some studies found that the immigrants are a benefit to the local population and others 
claimed the opposite (see, for example, Berry and Soligo, 1969; Rivera-Batiz, 1982 and 
Borjas, 1995). However, it is widely believed that illegal immigration is detrimental to 
the host country. This is because the illegal immigrants impose additional costs by the 
essence of their illegality, in addition to the burden imposed by their illegality, i.e. the 
replacement of local workers. The illegal immigrants tend not to pay taxes and are often 
involved in clandestine activities both as felons and as victims. Furthermore, their 
existence serves as a signal to the natives that the government does not enforce the law 
or that illegality is acceptable, thus causing them to avoid paying taxes (see Epstein and 
Weiss, 2006). 
  Many articles discuss the government’s efforts to control illegal immigration 
(for example, Ethier, 1986; Chiswick, 1988; Zimmermann, 1995; Djajic, 1999; Gaytan-
Fregoso and Lahiri, 2000 and more recently Guzman et al., 2007). Efforts to reduce 
illegal immigration utilize a number of instruments. The main instrument is the 
allocation of resources for apprehending illegal immigrants. This is implemented via 
border controls which block the entry of undesirable elements as well as internal 
enforcement, whereby such people are apprehended and expelled from the country. 
Some countries also provide foreign aid to the country of origin in order to reduce 
income differentials and thus the incentive to immigrate. An additional way to minimize 
                                                  
2See http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/190 
3 See http://www.cis.org/topics/illegalimmigration.html    2
illegal immigration, which has recently become very common, is to grant amnesties to 
illegal immigrants who have been in the country for an extended period of time. 
  The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 in the U.S.A. 
represents an attempt to control illegal immigration by imposing fines on employers 
who hire unauthorized workers (see for example Cobb-Clark et al., 1995). Employers 
who knowingly hire illegal alien workers are subject to civil money penalties of $250 to 
$2,000 per worker for a first offense and $3,000 to $10,000 per alien for a third 
offense
4. Western Europe countries, such France and Germany, also enacted employer 
sanctions in the mid-1970s. In France Employers are liable for penalties of up to 1000 
times minimum wage, while in Germany the maximum fine is 52,600$. In UK 
employer sanctions exist since 1997 and the maximum fine is 8,000$ per illegal worker 
hired (Martin and Miller, 2000) 
A vast literature exists on migration policy (see for example, Benhabib, 1996, 
Bauer et al, 2000), but only few articles examine the interaction between economic and 
political processes. Amegashie (2004) studied a model in which the number of 
immigrants allowed into a country is the outcome of a costly political lobbying process 
between a firm and a union, using the all-pay auction contest. Epstein and Nitzan (2006) 
have recently presented a model for the endogenous determination of quotas, viewing 
the quota as the outcome of a two-stage political contest between two interest groups, 
i.e. workers and capital owners. Garcia (2006) explained why the control of 
immigration may be a relevant issue in elections and demonstrated that rightist parties 
have an advantage of winning in countries where immigration control is a relevant issue 
in the election. Grether et al. (2001) determined the migration policy as result of the 
electorate’s preferences. Epstein and Hillman (2003) presented migration policy 
implications of the efficiency wage setting. 
  Although many studies deal with the issue of illegal immigration, as mentioned 
above, there are almost no references to the employers’ decision regarding the number 
of legal and illegal workers. The majority of these studies simply assume that when the 
expected penalty faced by the employer increases, the number of illegal immigrants 
                                                  
4 In some countries sanctions are less effective at deterring illegal entry and employment for several 
reasons, including among others, allocation of few resources, the spread of false documents and 
insufficient cooperation between government agencies. 
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decreases (see for example Epstein, Hillman and Weiss, 1999). In our study we consider 
the relationship between the number of illegal immigrants and the employer's benefits 
(wage gap between legal and illegal workers) and costs of employing them (expected 
penalty). We also examine how a change in the minimum wage affects the illegal 
immigrants and the local workers. 
Another purpose of this study is to examine the optimal migration policy. The 
low wage requested by foreign workers encourages capital owners to employ them. The 
policy maker may protect the unskilled workers by establishing a minimum wage law 
and allocating resources to catch the non-complying employers (i.e. employers who 
employ illegal workers). In our model two interest groups are directly affected by the 
migration policy: the capital owners who benefit from illegal immigrants and the 
unskilled workers who suffer from them. The public is affected indirectly by illegal 
immigration. The politician determines the optimal policy by taking into account all the 
factors: the capital owners’ and the unskilled workers’ utility, the public interest and the 
financing cost. 
  This paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the decision 
faced by the illegal workers and the employers. Section 3 determines the optimal 
enforcement budget. The last section contains a brief summary and conclusion. 
 
2. The Employers’ and the Workers’ Decisions 
The employer’s decision: 
Consider a small open and competitive economy where the employers are risk neutral 
and may employ local unskilled workers or foreign workers in return for a wage that is 
lower than the equilibrium wage of a closed economy. In order to protect these workers, 
the government establishes a minimum wage,  M w , for all workers. Moreover 
immigration law forbids employing foreign workers who lack employment 
authorization. 
The employer’s profits equal: 
 
(1)         () E M VF N Nw Π =− , 
   4
Where  N  is the number of unskilled workers,  () FN is the production function, which 
satisfies 0 ) ( ' ' , 0 ) ( ' < > N F N F , and V  is the product price.  Denote the optimal number 
of unskilled workers by
* N , which satisfies: 
 
(2)       '( ) M VF N w = , 
 
Now we assume the following: 
1.  The employer may employ illegal workers,I , who are perfect substitutes for the 
legal unskilled workers. 
2.  The wage for a foreign illegal worker, I w , is lower than the wage of a legal 
workers,  M w  (below we will determine the foreign illegal worker's wage,  I w ). 
3.  The employer pays wages which are lower than the minimum wage only to the 
illegal immigrants. The reason for this is that the illegal foreign workers are 
afraid to complain about their employers paying them a low wage. When an 
illegal worker is apprehended, both the worker and the employer are affected: 
the illegal worker is expelled from the country and sanctions against the 
employer are implemented. In addition, as seen below, the wage requested by 
foreign workers may be lower significantly from the wage requested by local 
worker. Therefore the “illegal workers” are herewith called “illegal immigrants”. 
4.  An employer who employs illegal immigrants may be detected and punished 
with probability p . 
5.  The policy maker can regulate, p , by an enforcement budget, E , i.e.  () pE such 
that  ( ) ( ) '0 , ' '0 pE pE >< . 
6.  The penalty for employing illegal workers depends on the number of illegal 
immigrants, ) (I θ , such that  0 ) 0 ( = θ  and  '( ) 0, ''( ) 0 II θ θ >> .
5 Moreover, we 
assume that () ''' 0 0 θ = . This assumption simplifies our calculations. Below we 
show where this assumption is used and that it is not critical for our results. 
                                                  
5 Indeed, in a lot of countries, the fine is constant for each employee, but when marginal production 
decreases then the apprehension of a worker increases the costs to the employer in a non-linear way. In 
addition, the financial cost of the fine (for instance, the marginal interest) increases as the total fines 
increases.   5
7.  At the beginning of each period, the employer decides on the number of legal 
and illegal workers to employ. 
 
The employer’s expected profit is given by: 
 
(3)       ( ) () ( ) EM I EV F N L w I w p I θ Π= − − −  
s.t. 
(3’)       NL I = + , 
 
The employer determines the optimal number of workers and illegal immigrants. 
Therefore, the first-order-conditions for maximizing the profits are
6: 
 

























We obtain that the wages will equal: 
 
(6.1)       '( ) MI ww p I θ = +  
and 
(6.2)       '( ) '( ) I VF N w p I θ = + , 
 
  At equilibrium, the marginal cost of employing an illegal immigrant equals the 
wage of a legal worker - the minimum wage,  M w . The employer employs illegal 
immigrants as long as the cost for employing them,  '( ) I wpI θ + , is lower or equal to the 
minimum wage. Afterwards, he continues to employ legal workers as long as their 
wage,  M w , is lower or equal to the marginal value of production,  '( ) VF N . This result is 
supported by Yaniv’s (2001) conclusions that the employer reduces employment to the 
                                                  
6 The second-order conditions for maximum are satisfied.   6
point where the marginal value of the production equals the minimum wage but the total 
number of workers doesn’t change as a result of violating the migration law. 
 
Lemma 1:  A positive relationship exists between the stock of employed illegal 
immigrants and the level of minimum wage. 
 
Proof: Using the inverse function rule with equation (6.1) we obtain: 
 
(7)        
11

















.        ! 
 
 
The illegal immigrants’ decision: 
It is assumed that the wage in the destination country is higher than the wage in the 
source country. However, the immigrant has an adjustment cost that stems from living 
in an unfamiliar environment (see, for example, Chiswick, 1999). In addition to this 
cost, the illegal immigrant is subject to apprehension and deportation by the authorities. 
If he is apprehended, he has additional the costs of lost wages and distress. 
  The potential immigrant will therefore agree to immigrate illegally if the wage 
received in the destination country,  I w , is higher than the wage in the source country, 
H w , including the penalty if he is apprehended,  p λ , and the adjustment cost in the host 
country, c. The condition for illegal immigration can be written as follows: 
 
(8)         λ p c w w H I + + ≥ , 
 
Note that this condition is written for one period.
7  
                                                  
7 For simplicity, we ignore the one-time moving cost. But it can be assumed that this cost is divided over 
all the periods.   7
The employer pays the illegal immigrants the minimal wage that they are willing 
to accept. Setting equation (8) into (5) gives:   
 








Equation (9) determines the conditions for the optimal number of illegal immigrants, 
e I , that are employed for a given enforcement budget, E . Let us explain this equality 
by looking at figure 1 that represents equation (9): the solid line represents the number 
of employed workers,  e N , whereas the dashed line represents the number of legal 
workers (local and foreign),  e L . The gap between these lines represents the number of 
illegal workers,  e I . At point (a) the government does not allocate resources against 
illegal immigration (i.e., () 0 pE = ), the employers employ only illegal immigrants and 
their number is higher than
* N , the number of workers whose marginal product value 
equals the minimum wage (see equation (2)). In area (b) the probability of being 
detected increases and the number of illegal immigrants decreases. However, the 
employer continues to employ only illegal immigrants and their number is higher 
than
* N . In area (c) the employer employs both legal and illegal workers such that the 
cost of employing illegal workers equals the cost of employing legal workers, i.e. the 
minimum wage. The number of all the workers equals 
* N . In area (d) the probability of 
being detected is so great that the employer complies with the law and employs only 
legal workers.  To summarize,  
 
Proposition 1 (see figure 1): 
(a)   If  0 = p  then  ee NIN == and 0 e L = . Therefore,  e N   satisfies: 
 
(10)         '( ) eH VF N w c = + . 
 










ee NIN =>  and  0 e L = .  Therefore,  e I   satisfies: 
   8
(11)         '( ) '( ) eH e VF I w c p p I λ θ = ++ + . 
 
(c) If  * (,)
'( ) '(0)








e NN = , 
* (, 0 ) e IN ∈  and
* (0, ) e L N ∈ . 
Therefore,   e I  satisfies: 
 












ee NLN = =  and  0 e I = . Therefore,  e L   satisfies: 
 
(13)       '( ) eM VF L w = . 
 
Proof: 
(a)  From setting  0 p =  in equations (8) and (6.1), we obtain  IH wwc =+  and 
M I ww >  ( M w  is constant), respectively. This means that the cost of employing 
an illegal immigrant is lower than in the case of  0 p >  and than the wage for a 
legal worker. The employer therefore employs only illegal workers. From 
equation (6.2) we obtain that the number of employed workers holds 
'( ) eH I VF N w c w =+ = . 
(b) From equations (8) and (6.1) it follows that the cost of employing an illegal 
immigrant is higher than the cost of case (a), but is still lower than the wage for 
a legal worker. The employer thus continues to employ only illegal workers. 
From equation (6.2) together with (8), we obtain that the number of employed 
illegal workers holds  '( ) '( ) eH e VF I w c p p I λ θ = ++ + . 
(c)  From equations (6.1), (6.2) and (8) it follows that  '( ) '( ) eM I e VF N w w p I θ = =+  
such that  IH wwc p λ =+ +. This means that the cost of employing illegal 
immigrants equals the wage for legal workers and equals the marginal product. 
(d) From equation (6.1) it follows that the cost of employing legal workers is higher 
than the wage for legal immigrants, i.e.  '( ) MI ww p I θ <+ . The employer   9
therefore employs only legal workers and their number holds  '( ) eM VF L w = .  
                                                      ! 
 
Let us now focus on the case of area (c) under which both illegal and legal workers are 
employed.  In this case, the total number of workers is identical to the number of 
workers that would be employed if only legal workers  are employed (d).  
 
3. Optimal Policy 
Let us firstly examine how a change in the minimum wage affects the number of local 
workers employed. The legally employed workers consist of the legal native workers, 
L L , and the foreign workers,  F L . We assume that the employers first employ the local 
workers, and if there is a surplus demand for legal workers then they import foreign 
workers.  The number of local workers is given by: 
 
(14)       LF L NL I = −− . 
 
Figure 2 describes the effect of increasing the minimum wage to 
1
M M ww >  on 
the optimal number of workers, 
* N . From equation (2) and from the sign of the second 




< . Thus the optimal 
number of workers thus decreases from 
* N  to
* * N .  

























, respectively. Hence, 
area (b) – the area of employing only illegal workers – expands and area (d) – the area 
of employing only legal workers – diminishes. This is supported by lemma 1, which 




> . This means that if the government wants to prevent the rise in the 
stock of illegal immigrants resulting from the increase in the minimum wage, it must 
allocate more resources to counteract illegal immigration (moving to the right in figure   10
2). An additional effect of the rise in the minimum wage is described as follows: the 
supply of local workers who wish to work for the current wage increases and the 





<  (The illegal immigrants and the 
local workers replace them). 
A change in the minimum wage affects the number of legal workers and equals: 
 






Proposition 2:  
a.  Raising the minimum wage decreases the number of legal workers employed if 
the wage is lower than the equilibrium wage of a closed economy. The change in 
the number of legal workers is greater than the change in the number of all 
workers. 








=−< , the LHS, the change in the number of legal workers, 








b.  When the minimum wage increases the supply of local workers increases and 
they replace the legal foreign workers. However, the total number of workers 
diminishes and the number of illegal workers rises. If the former effect is bigger 
than the latter, then the number of local workers increases, and vice versa if the 
former effect is smaller than the latter.  
L F
M MMM
dL dN dI dL
dw dw dw dw
=−−, the two first   11
terms of RHS are negative and the last term is positive. Therefore, it is 





.    ! 
 
It should be noted that recent studies have indeed found zero or even a positive 
effect of minimum wage on employment in monopsony markets (Dickens et al., 1999). 
However, other studies show that raising the minimum wage has a negative effect on 
employment (see Yaniv, 2001). Our model differs from the existing type of models in 
the literature.  
 
3.1 The optimal enforcement budget 
In our model the politician determines the optimal enforcement budget. We 
assume that the politician wishes to maximize social welfare, including the costs and 
benefits of the unskilled workers, the capital owners and the economic as well as social 
costs as a result of illegal immigration. It should be noted that if the politician 
determines the optimal minimum wage and the struggle between the unskilled workers 
and the capital owners is over the minimum wage rather than over the enforcement 
level, our main results will not change.
8 
When the enforcement budget increases, the capital owners reduce the number 
of illegal immigrants for two reasons: 1. the probability of being detected and the 
expected penalty increase. 2. The wage requested by the illegal immigrants also 
increases (see equation (8)). Hence, increasing the enforcement budget causes a 
decrease in the capital owners’ profits. The main costs of the existence of illegal 
immigration are displacement of the local unskilled workers and a reduction in received 
wages. It is thus clear that increasing the enforcement budget decreases the number of 
immigrants staying in the host country, the unemployment of local unskilled workers 
decreases and their utility increases. 
The secondary costs are caused by the essence of their illegality. For example, 
the undocumented immigrants are often involved in clandestine activities and are used 









, where G  is the politician’s objective function, E  is the enforcement 
budget and  M w  is the minimum wage.   12
as signals to the public that the government does not enforce the law. Raising the 
resource allocation to enforce the immigration law, i.e. the enforcement budget, reduces 
the social cost, but it has a price – the alternative use. This means that these resources 
are allocated non-productive activities. 
The unskilled workers are interested in raising the enforcement budget, while 
the capital owners are interested in reducing it.  
The government’s objective function is represented by:
9 
 
(16)     ( ) 1( ) LE GC I E α αβγ =Π+ − Π− −  , 
 
WhereE  is the enforcement budget, α  is the workers’ relative political strength 
( ) 01 α <<,  L Π  is the local workers’ earning
10,  E Π  is the profits of the capital owners 
as given in equation (3), C  is the social harm resulting from the existence of illegal 
immigrants, such that  ( ) 0 0 , ' () 0 , ' ' () 0 CC I C I =>< ,  β  and γ  denote the weights of 
this social harm and the enforcement budget ( ) 0,1 βγ < < , respectively.   Equation (16) 
can be rewritten as: 
 
(17)     ( ) 1( ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( ) LM M I GL w V F N w N I I w p I C IE α αθ β γ =+ − − − − − − − . 
 
The optimal enforcement budget equals: 
 
                                                  
9 Another scenario is that the enforcement budget is financed by the fines and taxes. The public bears the 
tax burden paying for the enforcement (like Guzman et al., 2007) and takes part in the struggle. Hence the 
government’s objective function will be   
 
( )
















Where t is the tax, the other variables are similar to the paper’s body.  The core of the results does not 
change and will be provided on request. 
10 We use the workers’ wages, and not the workers’ surplus, because the declared main goal of the 
minimum wage is to maximize the total income transfer to minimum wage workers (Sobel, 1999). 
Furthermore, the labor supply curve is unknown (except for the fact that it increases) and when the 
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The regulator faces a given employers’ and illegal immigrants’ behavior, as discussed 
above. The difference between the minimum wage and the illegal workers’ wage at 
equilibrium equals the expected penalty (see equation (6.1)): 
 
(19)       '( ) M I p Iww θ = − , 
 
In addition, from equation (8) it follows that: 
 









From setting equation (19) and (20) into (18), we obtain: 
 
 (21)  
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Rearranging equation (21) gives us: 
 
(22)     () () () () 1' 0
L
M
dG L p I
wI I C I
dE E E E
αα λ θ β γ
∂∂ ∂




Hence, the optimal enforcement is given by
11: 
 




wC I I I
EE E
αβ γ α λ θ
∂∂ ∂
−= + − +
∂∂ ∂
, 
                                                  
11 It is assumed that the sufficient second order conditions are satisfied.   14
 
















3.2 Comparative static 
Suppose that an exogenous change in the minimum wage has taken place.
12 Let us now 
examine how this change affects the optimal enforcement budget. 
As shown above, raising the minimum wage decreases the number of employed 
workers and increases the number of illegal immigrants working in the host country. 
We also see that the effect, of raising the minimum wage for the local workers’ 
employment, is not clear. The unskilled workers and the capital owners are affected by 
the migration policy and struggle in order to change the enforcement budget. Indeed, the 
capital owners suffer from the additional cost of illegal immigration and finance the 
enforcement. However, their direct benefit from illegal immigration is higher. We can 
therefore say that the unskilled workers have an interest in a large enforcement budget, 
while the capital owners have the opposite interest.  
Denote the optimal enforcement budget (which satisfies (23)) by 
* E . Let us now 
examine how an exogenous change in the minimum wage affects 









13  It can be verified that: 
 





























  is assumed to be negative, so: 
                                                  
12 The changes in the minimum wage can be caused by a change in the average wage, while the minimum 
wage is adjacent to it or inflation occurs and the minimum wage is eroded, or the government is subjected 
to political constraints to raise the minimum wage  (see Sobel, 1999). 
13  The essence of the results does not change -  proof will be provide on request.   15
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. Hence, from equation (22) we obtain: 
 






G LL p I I
wI
Ew E Ew E w w
αα λ θ
∂    ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂
=+ − − +    ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
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From equation (9) and the quotient rule, we obtain: 
 














Setting equation (27) into (26) gives: 
 
(28) 
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Equation (28) can be written as: 
 
(29)     ( ) () ( )
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=+ + −  ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ + ∂ ∂ 
, 
 
Setting equation (9) into (29) affords: 
   16
(30)     ( ) ()
2 2 .
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Ew E Ew E w
αα θ
∂  ∂∂ ∂ ∂
=+ + −  ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ 
, 
 
After setting equation (7) into (30), we obtain: 
 








Ew w E E E
αα
∂  ∂∂ ∂
=+ + −  ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
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Hence, by equation (24) and (31) it follows that: 
 








ww E E E
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, 
 
The first term in RHS denotes the effect of a change in the enforcement budget on the 
unskilled workers’ wages, whereas the second term denotes the effect of a change in the 
enforcement budget on the capital owners’ profits. It is obvious that there is a negative 







). However, the effect of a change in the enforcement budget on the unskilled 
workers’ wages is ambiguous.  
 







,  we distinguish between two cases: 
 
A) Local workers are willing to work at the minimum wage 
As we see in figure 3.1 the employer employs local workers but does not need to 
employ legal foreign workers, i.e.  0 F L = . If the government raises the enforcement 











 (See appendix A).  The first component of RHS in 
equation (32) is therefore positive and the second is negative.  
   17
Proposition 3: The effect of changes in the minimum wage on the optimal enforcement 
budget depends on the political strength of the groups. If the workers’ weight, α , is 


















, then a positive relation exists between the optimal 

















, then a 
negative relation exists between the optimal enforcement budget and the minimum 
wage. 
 
Proof: See appendix B. 
 
The intuition for this result is as follows: as stated in lemma 1, raising the minimum 
wage causes an increase in the illegal immigrants employed in the host country. It is 
also clear that as the total number of workers and the total production decreases, the 
expected penalty increases and the capital owners’ profits decrease (see appendix C). 
This is followed by an increase in the number of employed illegal immigrants, the 
unemployment among the local workers increases and therefore the utility of the local 
workers decreases.  
 If the workers have a high political strength relative to the capital owners' then the 
policy maker raises the resource allocation against illegal migration with an increase in 
the minimum wage. The reason for this is that increasing the budget enforcement 
prevents an increase in the stock of illegal immigrants and possible harm to the local 
workers’ utility. However, if the capital owners have strong political strength, the policy 
maker reduces the enforcement budget with an increase in the minimum wage since 
increasing the minimum wage decreases the capital owners’ profits. The politician 
wishes to raise, or at least maintain, the utility of the strong group, and achieves this by 
reducing the enforcement budget. 
 
   18
B)  No local workers are willing to work at the minimum wage  
Look at figure 3.2. In this case the demand for legal workers is higher than the local 
supply. Thus, the employer should employ legal foreign workers, i.e.  0 F L > . Raising 
the enforcement budget reduces the stock of illegal workers, increases the number of 


































 into equation (32), gives: 
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∂  




Proposition 4: When the minimum wage increases and there are no local workers 
willing to work for this wage, the policy maker decreases the enforcement budget. 
 
In this case, as a result of increasing the minimum wage the utility of one group, the 
capital owners, decreases while the utility of the other group, the local workers, does not 
change (the illegal immigrants displace the legal foreign workers but not the legal local 
workers). The politician may increase the capital owners’ profits without harming the 
local workers’ utility. The politician therefore reduces the enforcement budget as long 
as there is no harm in the local workers’ employment. After that he behaves as 
described in case (A). 
Let us examine how a change in the strength of one of the parties affects the 
optimal enforcement budget.   In a way similar to (32) we obtain:  
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It is clear that increasing the workers’ relative political strength raises the enforcement 
budget and vice versa if the capital owners’ relative political strength increases. It is 






, then the local workers have no incentive to try to 
increase their relative political strength. 
 
4. Conclusion  
We examined two policy measures designed to protect the unskilled workers and the 
public: preventing a decrease in wage by a minimum wage law and allocating resources 
to enforce the immigration law. We have focused on the employers’ behavior and on the 
consequent migration policy. As opposed to studies assuming a negative relationship 
between the enforcement budget and the stock of illegal workers, we find the 
relationship between the number of employed illegal immigrants and the enforcement 
budget: at low budget levels employers employ only illegal workers and their number is 
higher than the total number of workers at higher budget levels. At high budget levels 
the employer complies with the immigration law and employs only legal workers.  
In our story we consider a small open economy. The employer may employ 
legal workers and either pay them minimum wage or not. However, the employer 
prefers to discriminate against the foreign workers by paying them a lower wage than 
the local workers, because they are in the country illegally and may be afraid to 
complain to the authorities. Thus foreign illegal workers are willing to work for a wage 
which is lower than that of the native workers’ wage and is higher than the wage they 
would obtain in the home country. The first main issue discussed in the paper is the 
effect of increasing the minimum wage on the domestic workers and the illegal workers. 
The existing literature deals in detail with the subject of the effect of the minimum wage 
on employment (see Dickens et al., 1999; Yaniv, 2001). However, there is no reference 
to the effect on the various groups: illegal immigrants and local workers.  
Our results show that increasing the minimum wage may increase, decrease or 
not change the number of employed local workers but also raises the stock of illegal 
immigrants working in the host country. This result supports the established claim in the 
literature that a positive correlation exists between the wage in the host country and the 
number of immigrants (legal and illegal) (see Chiswick, 1999; Hanson and Spilimbero,   20
1999). However in our model, the rise in the stock of illegal immigrants is caused by the 
increased employers’ demand, while in the others the reason is hidden in the increase in 
the immigrants’ supply which is triggered by a wage differential.   
  The second main issue deals with the optimal enforcement budget. The 
politicians determine the optimal enforcement budget based on the employers’ and the 
illegal immigrants’ behavior which was examined in the first part while taking into 
consideration the public interest. Following Epstein and Nitzan (2006), we assume two 
interest groups: native unskilled workers who are harmed by the illegal immigration and 
the capital owners who benefit from it. Finally, we study the effect of a change in the 
minimum wage on the optimal enforcement budget. We show that the relationship 
between the optimal enforcement budget and the minimum wage depends on the 
groups’ relative strength. If the workers’ union is strong, then increasing the minimum 
wage increases the optimal enforcement, and vice versa if the capital owners are the 
strong group.  
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Figure 3.1 
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Appendix A 










.  The intuition is as follows: When the 
minimum wage rises more local workers wish to work, unemployment among the local 
population increases, and the effect of change in the enforcement budget on the 







The formal proof: 






















From equation (6.1) it follows that: 
 


































∂∂  +  ∂ ∂∂  =−
∂∂
 
Under the above assumptions [see assumption (5)] the third derivative of the penalty 
() ''' I θ  equals zero. This assumption simplifies matters. Alternatively, it can be assumed 







 is very small or equals zero. 
Hence, 
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The effect of raising the minimum wage on the capital owners’ profits: 
From equation (3) we obtain: 
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dw W w w w w
θ
 ∂Π ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
=− − − − − −  ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
, 
From equation (6), we obtain: 
 (C.2) '( ) M I p Iww θ =−  and   '( ) M VF N w = , 
Substituting (C.2) into (C.1) gives us:   28
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It is clear that  NI > , hence 
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